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Purpose: Effective tax rates can have dual effect in the economic policy of a country by 
maintaining the state revenues in sustainable levels providing a safe net for the economic 
development. If taxation struggles the economy, there should be a turning point were the 
results of high tax rates do not have the expected results on the state revenue. The parabolic 
relation of Laffer curve is tested on a data set of different OECD countries. 
Design/Approach/Methodology: Three different functions have been selected to test the 
Laffer curve starting from the fact that the relation of revenues with taxes should have a 
parabolic form, with the turning point to be the peak of the parabola. 
Findings: The findings suggest that there exists a peak point where taxation policy is not 
providing the expected revenues. Results suggest that this pattern is common in several 
countries with different taxation regimes.  The effective tax rates are different between the 
countries. Countries are divided into clusters with the same effective tax rates. The relation 
of the tax revenue and taxation rates is adjusted with the tax moral of the country. 
Practical Implications: The results are compared with other possible forms of the relation of 
revenue and taxes with considerable importance.  
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the most well-known arguments of the supply-side economists that made the 
Laffer curve popular in the early 1980s is that lower tax rates would generate higher 
tax revenues and eventually stimulate economic activity in a spiral effect. In a 
previous research (Liapis and Politis, 2018) we try to investigate the existence of 
Laffer economic effect in property taxation, where we found that the revenue from 
the property income have a maximizing point and then start to decline when the 
taxation rate is escalating. On the other hand, property tax had a more 
straightforward relation with tax rates (Liapis and Galanos, 2010). This paper 
investigates the relationship between tax rates and the relevant tax revenues in the 
field of personal income taxation, corporate income taxation and taxation of 
dividends in the majority of OECD economies for the period 2000-2016. It 
concludes by presenting the similarities among tax regimes of the countries included 
in the research.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
As Laffer (2004)5 described, the basic idea behind the relationship between tax rates 
and tax revenues is that there exists a trade-off between two effects on tax revenue – 
the arithmetic effect i.e., reduced tax rates yield reduced tax revenues and the 
economic effect i.e., tax cuts create incentives to increase output, employment and 
production (Liapis et al., 2012; 2014). The arithmetic effect always works in the 
opposite direction from the economic effect and as a result the overall effect on tax 
revenues is rather ambiguous. The illustration of this relationship between tax rates 
and revenues is a simple curve. The so called Laffer curve has an inverted U shape, 
illustrating that when the tax rate is 0%, revenue is zero. As the tax rate increases the 
revenue outcome raises, maximizes and declines when the tax rate reaches 100%. 
 
There has been considerable public debate on the possibility of an inverse 
relationship between tax rates and government revenue (Fullerton, 1981). Kiefer 
(1978) opposed the Laffer curve as it represented ‘a gross simplification of a major 
portion of macro-economics into a single curved line’. He argued that the Laffer 
curve only took into account incentive and supply side effects, therefore ignoring 
demand side effects. Atkinson and Stern (1980) and Hemming and Kay (1980) 
stated that even if the endpoints of the Laffer curve for 0% and 100% tax rate are 
zero tax revenues, the general shape of the curve depends on the curve being a 
continuous function. Malcomson (1986), following Mirowski (1982) questioned 
some properties of the Laffer curve and especially its inverted U shape, arguing that 
 
5As Laffer himself describes in his article, the Laffer Curve concept was first introduced by 
Wanniski (1978) but the theory behind it has its origin back in the 14th century, with a more 
recent version written by John Maynard Keynes. Fullerton (1982), Ballard et al (1985), van 
Ravestein and Vijlbrief (1988) and Hsing (1996) attribute the association of higher taxes 
with lower government revenue to Adam Smith (1776). 
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demand factors as well as other variables, such as the wage rate and the profits, 
determine the tax base. Malcomson suggested that empirical work on Laffer curve 
needs to use a well-established model, rich enough to capture dynamic economic 
forces. Agell and Persson (2001) characterized the concept of a Laffer curve effect 
as not self-evident in an intertemporal framework. Several empirical studies examine 
the existence (or not) of a Laffer curve either focusing on individual countries or on 
country groups such as the OECD and EU countries. Galanos et al. (2014) have 
investigated the tax competitiveness between EU countries with interesting results.  
 
Canto et al. (1981) regressed for the USA the income tax revenue against the income 
tax rates for the period 1951-1964 and proved that there was a revenue maximizing 
tax rate above which revenues would decrease. Van Ravestein and Vijlbrief (1988) 
estimated the Laffer curve for the Netherlands for the period 1960-1985. They found 
that the revenue maximizing tax rate (considering the true proportion of government 
income being spent on benefits) was 70% while the actual rate was 67% and 
therefore the economy was operating on the upward-sloping portion of the Laffer 
curve. Hsing (1996) estimated for the USA a Laffer curve for the period 1959-1991 
for the personal income tax, using a single-factor model and four specific functional 
forms – linear, log-log, linear-log and log-linear. Hsing confirmed the inverted U-
shaped for the personal income tax while the revenue maximizing tax rate was 
estimated between 32.67% and 35.21%.  
 
Karas (2012) followed Hsing’s methodology to model the relationship between the 
personal income tax rate and the relevant tax revenue for the period 1993-2010 in 
the Czech Republic. His results also confirmed empirically the inverted U-shape 
relationship between tax rates and tax revenues. He found that the historical tax rate 
was lower than the revenue maximizing tax rate which for personal income tax was 
equal to 33.13% of gross annual income. Sen et al. (2017) also empirically examined 
the Laffer curve for the personal income tax in Turkey for the period 1970-2015, 
confirming the validity of the Laffer curve hypothesis. They concluded that Turkey’s 
personal income tax rate falls in the prohibitive range of the Laffer curve and should 
be lowered in order to collect more revenue. Brill and Hassett (2007) examined the 
existence of a corporate Laffer curve, for a panel of OECD countries over the period 
1981-2005. The authors estimated the Laffer curve for the corporate tax rate and 
they found robust evidence for the existence of a trade-off between the corporate tax 
rate and corporate tax revenues.  
 
Stuart (1981) examined the effects of the increase in the level of taxation in Sweden 
in the 1970s using a two-sector model. The model contained a single household 
which allocates labor to either taxed or untaxed uses. Stuart concluded that high 
taxes on labor income can have quite significant effects on the sale of labor in taxed 
markets when alternative untaxed uses of labor exist. Also, he concluded that the 
revenue maximizing tax rate was about 70%, significantly lower than the 80% rate at 
the time of the analysis, indicating that Sweden was on the prohibitive range of the 
Laffer curve. Heijman and van Ophem (2005) developed a model of optimum 
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taxation that takes into account a possible shift to informal economy for a number of 
OECD countries for the period 1988-1966. According to Heijman and van Ophem, 
an alternative for economic agents to becoming inactive when tax rates become too 
high, is to become active in the black labor economy. They estimated the willingness 
to pay tax in most countries and compared their actual tax rates with the tax revenue 
maximizing rates. The optimal marginal rate is always lower than 36%.  
 
Busato and Chiarini (2011) incorporate as well in a two sector dynamic equilibrium 
model tax evasion and underground activities to derive Laffer Curves for personal 
income and corporate income taxation for the Italian economy. They find that a 
Laffer curve exists with and without an underground sector, and they show that the 
strong impact of shadow economy on Laffer curves stems from the high elasticity of 
substitution between the formal and the informal sector. Vogel (2012) uses a 
general-equilibrium approach to capture the direct and indirect effects of tax policy 
measures, i.e., the effect of tax rate increases on tax revenues and the second round 
effects on their own or other tax bases. He extends the QUEST III model by tax 
avoidance and derives the revenue maximizing rates which are relatively high for 
corporate and personal income taxation compared to actual EU-average implicit 
labor and corporate tax rates.  In economies where the official and the informal 
sector are closer substitutes the Laffer curve for labor and corporate taxation flattens.  
 
Trabandt and Uhilg (2011) using a neoclassical growth model featuring ‘‘constant 
Frisch elasticity’’ (CFE) of labor supply, found that there is a Laffer curve with 
respect to both capital and labor income taxation for the US, the EU-14 and several 
individual EU countries. Average labor, capital and consumption tax rates in all 
countries lie below the peak of their Laffer Curves. Using a dynamic scoring 
analysis, they show that for the US model 32% of a labor tax cut and 51% of a 
capital tax cut are self-financing while for the EU-14 54% of a labor tax cut and 79% 
of a capital tax cut are self-financing. Kawano and Slemrod (2015) and Vokshi 
(2018) examine the relationship between corporate tax rates and corporate tax 
revenues, incorporating also in their research tax base changes, following their 
findings that changes to corporate tax rates often take place simultaneously with 
changes to the corporate tax base. They find that the relationship between corporate 
tax rates and corporate tax revenues is attenuated, pushing up the estimated revenue-
maximizing rate.  
 
Akgun et al. (2017) also examine the relationship between tax rates and the relevant 
tax revenues for personal and corporate income taxation as well as for consumption 
taxes for a panel of 34 OECD countries, for the period 1978-2014. They confirm the 
shape of the Laffer curve and they proceed by adding country-specific policies and 
framework conditions to examine the variation of estimated responses to tax rates. 
Dalamagas (1998) estimated the Laffer curve for 13 OECD countries for the period 
1964-1994 and his findings question the shape of the Laffer curve. As he explains 
“The shape is closely associated with both the theoretical underpinnings of the 
crowding out hypothesis and the literature on the disincentive effects of taxation”. 
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Therefore, a permanent reduction of tax rates may lead to increased long-run budget 
deficits in high taxed economies with crowding-out characteristics. For particular 
economic activities with high elasticities, tax rates approach the prohibitive range 
sooner than they would elsewhere in the economy. The exact location of Laffer’s 
curve depends on the supply elasticity of the factor being taxed (Ballard et al., 
1985). Fullerton (1982) and Ballard et al. (1985) used a general equilibrium model 
and they were able to plot the relationship between labor tax rates and government 
revenues for the US economy, for a variety of values of the labor supply elasticity. 
Their results indicate that the US could conceivably be operating in the prohibitive 
area of the Laffer curve but the labor supply elasticity would have to be much higher 
for a labor tax rate cut to increase revenues.  
 
Lindsey (1987) used cross-sectional data for the period 1980-1984 to estimate for 
the US the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the top marginal tax rate. He 
used two separate cross sections of data and a difference-in-differences method of 
study to create elasticities. He obtained elasticity estimates of 1.6 to 1.8 and found 
the greatest responsiveness to tax rate changes in high income earners. He showed 
that the US is on the prohibitive side of the Laffer curve during the time period 
because the tax cuts are associated with an increase in tax revenue. Feldstein (1995) 
studied the same group of individuals before and after the US Tax Reform Act of 
1986 to estimate the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the marginal tax rate 
for the US. He used a difference-in-differences calculation similar to Lindsey’s, 
except that he used panel data and not cross sectional data. He obtained elasticity 
estimates of 1.04 to 3.05 and similar to Lindsey’s results he also found the greatest 
responsiveness in high income earners. He as well pointed out that the US was on 
the right side of the Laffer Curve during the time period under study.  
 
Goolsbee (1999) and Saez (2004) challenged the findings of Lindsey and Feldstein. 
Goolsbee (1999) estimated taxable income elasticities with respect to the top 
marginal tax rate for several different time periods in the US, which range from 0.0 
to 0.7. He showed therefore that even if tax rates increase, tax revenue will still 
increase. Saez (2004) calculated long-term elasticities of the top 1% income share 
with respect to the top marginal tax rate which were less than one. His findings did 
not show evidence of the Laffer curve. 
 
The present study aims to further enhance the research on the existence of the 
arithmetic and economic effect of the taxation regimes in state revenues. 
Additionally, it will try to prove the existence of the Laffer curve in various 
countries. Finally, another contribution of this research is the cluster analysis of the 
countries with similar tax regimes and economic levels. The existence of the Laffer 
curve in a global scale will provide grounding of the inefficiency of centralized 
economies, where the economic activity is heavily funded from tax revenues. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the different equation models 
of tax revenue. Section 3 describes the tax data which were used for the econometric 
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estimation of the different models. Section 4 describes the estimation results for 
three categories a) corporate tax, b) overall personal and corporate tax and c) 
personal tax.  Section 5 presents the similarities of tax regimes among the OECD 
countries included in the analysis. 
 
3. Different Equation Models for Tax Revenue 
 
The research tries to identify which type of equation best describes how tax revenue 
is generated, both for personal income and corporate income tax. In order to estimate 
the best equation, three equation models with different specifications are fitted in the 
sample. The sample of data consists of different countries and periods. Tax revenue 
can be considered to be linear correlated with the tax rate: 
 
                                                                                                                  (1) 
 
Each country has a different tax base and it can be referred that the tax base is 
associated with the wealth levels of the country. The relationship between the 
effective tax rate, the wealth levels of the country and the tax base is summarized by 
the following identity, developed with the DuPont formula (OECD, 2017): 
 
                                                                                                            (2) 
 
Tax revenue as a percentage of GDP is determined by two ratios: tax revenue T over 
the tax base B and tax base B over GDP. Isolating the first term of equation (2), 
equation (1) can be transformed in the following linear correlation function, where 
the tax revenue is expressed as a percentage of GDP and linear related with a tax 
rate, which shifts depending on each country’s policy: 
 
                                                                                   (3) 
 
Where the subscripts i and t correspond to country and year, b0𝑖  represents the 
country fixed effects describing the country-specific tax conditions, τ𝑖𝑡   is the tax rate 
and ε𝑖𝑡  is the error term.  A positive relationship of the tax revenue (as a percentage 
of GDP) and the tax rate is expected. 
 
Returning back to equation (2), we proceed by considering the parabolic form, 
through which we introduce in our analysis the findings of Laffer’s theory. The first 
ratio corresponds to the effective marginal tax rate τ, i.e., the rate that transforms the 
tax base into revenue from taxes, i.e.:  
 
                                                                                                                         (4) 
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There are two channels through which the increase in the effective tax rate affects 
tax revenues:  
➢ The change in the tax rate times the given tax base, which is positive. This is 
the Laffer's arithmetic effect; 
➢ The indirect effect of the change in the tax rate on the tax base, which is 
expected to be negative. This is the Laffer's economic effect; 
 
As a result, the overall effect of a change in the tax rate on the relevant tax revenue 
is ambiguous and depends on whether the arithmetic or the economic effect will 
prevail.  
 
Laffer’s economic effect can be described as a function relating the size of the tax 
base with the level of the tax rate as follows:  
 
B                                                                                                           (5) 
 
Where b1 represents the tax free income threshold and b2 represents the marginal 
effect of the tax rate on the tax base, which according to Laffer’s theory, is expected 
to be negative, given that increased tax rates reduce the incentives to work, invest, 
save and consume. This concept expressed by Laffer (2004) is as in Feldstein’s 
(1995) elasticity of taxable income. 
 
Substituting this expression into equation (4) we derive the following equation 6: 
 
                                       (6) 
 
Finally, we add a fixed term for the shifts in tax regimes of each country, as well as 
an error term as in equation 7: 
 
+                                                                (7) 
 
Where the subscripts i and t correspond to country and year, b0𝑖  represents the 
country fixed effects describing the country-specific tax conditions, τ𝑖𝑡   is the tax rate 
and ε𝑖𝑡  is the error term. The b0 coefficient is of extreme importance, describing the 
government’s ability to increase tax revenues in each country, which may depend on 
the institutional framework and other country-specific socio-economic 
characteristics. The coefficient b1 is expected to have a positive sign, indicating a 
positive relationship of the tax revenue (as a percentage of GDP) and the tax rate. 
The coefficient b2 is expected to have a negative sign, indicating a negative 
relationship of the tax revenue and the square of the tax rate, so that the parabola 
curve has an inverted U shape, resembling the Laffer Curve. The turning point above 
which tax revenues will decrease when tax rates rise further gives the effective 
marginal tax rate. The turning point is presented in equation 8: 
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= -                                                                                                                    (8) 
 
The last equation which can considered is a the hyperbolic function where 
successive increases in tax rates generate smaller and smaller tax revenues increases, 
with the latter never falling and is expressed by the following equation 9 and in Ln 
form as in equation 10: 
 
                                                                               (9) 
 
Ln                                            (10) 
 
In its simplest form, the equation 10 becomes: 
 
(𝑇 / 𝐺𝐷𝑃) 𝑖𝑡 = b0𝑖 + b1* (1/ τ𝑖𝑡) + ε𝑖t                                                                                                                      (11) 
 
The coefficient b1 is expected to have a negative sign, indicating a negative 
relationship between the tax revenue (as a percentage of GDP) and the ratio 1/tax 
rate. In this functional form, (b0i – b1) approaches the maximum tax revenue per 
country with the second term always reducing it. In the extreme case where the tax 
rate is 100%, the tax revenue is identical with the above difference but never falls. 
 
Our sample consists of multiple entities and variables at multiple time periods. 
Taxation policy among countries differs and there exist outliers from the changes in 
taxation policy, which might have cross borders effects. For the Linear form and 
Parabolic equations the panel least squares methodology is used to test the sample. 
For the polynomial or parabolic form of the equation, estimated generalized least 
squares is considered appropriate with a cross section weighting in the sample. Panel 
cross section weights are eliminating sub-populations differences attribute to the 
wealth standard of each country.  
 
4. Description of the Dataset 
 
The analysis covers 31 OECD countries over the period 2000-2016. For corporate 
income tax, 26 OECD countries were included in the analysis, due to lack of data. 
Tax revenues are expressed as a percentage of GDP, as these indicators provide a 
standard way to compare tax levels across countries and over time. The main source 
for the data on tax revenues is the OECD Revenue Statistics Database, which 
provides detailed and internationally comparable tax data for all OECD countries 
from 1955 onwards.  
 
Specifically, data on corporate income tax revenues as a percentage of GDP were 
extracted from sub-heading 1210 ‘Taxes on Profits of Corporates’. Personal income 
tax revenues as a percentage of GDP are derived by adding data included in the 
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following subheadings 1110 ‘Taxes on Income, Profits and Capital Gains of 
Individuals’, 2100‘ Employees Social Security Contributions,’ and 3000 ‘Taxes on 
Payroll and Workforce’. The annual OECD Taxing Wages publication shows 
average and marginal effective tax rates for eight different household types, which 
vary by income level and household composition (single persons, single parents, one 
or two earners, couples with or without children). The effective all-in average tax 
rate is the total tax burden on personal income, calculated by the sum of personal 
income tax and employee social security contributions expressed as a percentage of 
gross wage earnings. 
 
The PIT analysis in the paper uses indicators of all –in average tax rate for single 
individuals earning 100% of the average wage for the sake of simplicity. Including 
families would not bring much information (Akgun et al., 2017). Data on the 
corporate tax rate (CIT) on distributed profits are derived from the OECD Tax 
Database, where the combined central and sub central statutory tax rates are 
reported. Also, in the same Tax Database OECD calculations based on country 
information on the taxation of dividends provide data on the overall PIT and CIT 
rate on dividends. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
5.1 Corporate Income Tax 
 
The results of estimating the effect of the CIT rate on corporate income tax revenue 
are summarized in the following Table 1: 
 
Table 1. Taxes on profits of corporations - Corporate income tax 
Dependent 
Variable: Taxes on 
profits of 
corporations (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
C 
2.229***                       
(0.368) 
-2.640*
(1.125) 
40.56***  
(0.294) 
2.213***  
(0.152) 
0.894  
(0.510) 
40.37*** 
(0.139) 
CIT rate on 
distributed profits 
0.032*                                                  0.399***                               
  
0.032***                                                    0.128***            
  (0.013) (0.081) (0.005) (0.036) 
CIT rate squared 
  
-0.007***                      
    
-0.002**                      
  (0.001) (0.001) 
1/CIT rate 
    
-2.4678**                    
    
-2.4186***                      
(0.7542) (3.689) 
Method 
Panel 
Least 
Squares 
Panel 
Least 
Squares 
Panel 
Least 
Squares 
Panel 
EGLS 
Panel 
EGLS 
Panel 
EGLS 
Observations 440 440 440 440 440 440 
Cross - sections 
included 26 26 26 26 26 26 
R-squared 0.014 0.059 0.023 0.853 0.863 0.861 
R-squared adjusted 0.012 0.055 0.022 0.843 0.854 0.853 
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F-Statistic 6.300 13.729 10.706 92.025 96.504 98.713 
Country Fixed 
Effects NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Standard Error 1.711 1.673 1.702 0.685 0.684 0.685 
 
The Panel Least Squares estimation method assumes that there is neither significant 
country nor significant temporal effects. Even though in the estimation results, the 
coefficients in all three equations have the expected signs, the fit of data in the 
equations have very low value, close to zero, indicating that a very small percentage 
of the total variation in Corporate Tax Revenues is explained by the model.  
 
The Estimated Generalized Least Squares method is considered appropriate with a 
cross section weighting in the sample, as subpopulation differences attributed to the 
wealth standard of each country are eliminated. The introduction of the additional 
term in the simple model provides additional predictive power in the model. The 
adjusted R- squared of the equation increased by 1 percent. The coefficient of the 
CIT rate has the expected positive sign and the coefficient of the CIT rate squared 
has the expected negative sign, both being statistically significant at 0.001 and 0.05 
levels. 
 
In model (6), the adjusted R- squared slightly falls compared to model (5). Also the 
coefficient of the 1/CIT rate variable has the expected sign, though its magnitude 
draws our attention and will be explored further with the progress of our research. 
As a conclusion, the non-monotonic relationship between the tax rate and the 
relevant tax revenue is confirmed and is in line with the Laffer curve theory.  
 
The average asymptotic rate equals the difference of the average intercept and the 
coefficient of the variable (1/CIT). In both models (3) and (6) it takes the value of 
approximately 37.95%. In the parabolic form of equation in model (2), the intercept 
has no economic meaning as it has a negative sign, a problem which is dealt with in 
model (5), where the Panel EGLS method is used. The effective tax rate after the 
conversion of the estimated coefficients into percentages equals 34.9%. Comparing 
the average asymptotic rate with the effective tax rate, we come to the conclusion 
that if in an economy there are no opportunities for tax evasion, the effective tax rate 
will be moving towards the asymptotic rate, though this conclusion needs to be 
further investigated. 
 
5.2 Overall Personal and Corporate Income Tax 
 
If we regress the corporate tax revenues against the overall personal and corporate 
tax rate on distributed dividends, we derive the following results as shown in Table 
2. Again the adjusted R-squared values are very low with the Panel Least Squares 
Estimation method, suggesting that the Estimated Generalized Least Squared 
method is more appropriate.  
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In model (4) the coefficient of overall PIT and CIT rate is not statistically significant 
at 0.5% level and does not have the expected positive sign. In model (5) the adjusted 
R-squared falls, penalizing the introduction of the extra variable in the model. Again, 
the estimated coefficients are not statistically significant at 0.5% level. 
  
Table 2. Taxes on profits of corporations - Overall Personal and Income Tax 
Dependent Variable: 
Taxes on profits of 
corporations (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
C 
3.082***  
(0.407) 
-2.345* 
(0.189) 
37.61***  
(0.318) 
3.147*** 
(0.128) 
2.131*** 
(2.131) 
32.26**
* (0.134) 
Overall PIT and CIT 
rate 
0.001 0.260***                                    
  
-0.000                                                       0.043
  (0.009) (0.054) (0.003) (0.026) 
Overal PIT and CIT 
rate squared   
-0.003***                      
    
-0.004                  
  (0.000) (0.000) 
1/overall PIT and CIT 
rate     
-2.7178**                    
    
-0,4091*                    
(1.3276) (0.5723) 
Method 
Panel 
Least 
Squares 
Panel 
Least 
Squares 
Panel 
Least 
Squares 
Panel 
EGLS 
Panel 
EGLS 
Panel 
EGLS 
Observations 440 440 440 440 440 440 
Cross - sections 
included 26 26 26 26 26 26 
R-squared 0 0.051 0.009 0.843 0.839 0.842 
R-squared adjusted -0.002 0.047 0.007 0.833 0.829 0.832 
F-Statistic 0.015 11.725 4.191 85.414 79.987 84.334 
Country Fixed Effects NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Standard Error 1.723 1.681 1.715 0.714 0.709 0.712 
 
In model (6), the R-squared value suggests that this model fits best. Also, the 
estimated coefficient has the expected negative sign of the hyperbolic function and is 
statistically significant at 0.5% level. The Laffer curve cannot be supported with the 
results of the parabolic specification. The hyperbolic equation proves to be more 
appropriate to describe the results. The observations made in section 5.1 are also 
valid in this section. Though, when the dividends tax is added to the corporate 
income tax rate and given the different tax treatment of dividends in OECD 
countries and the complexity of this tax, as it can be subject to personal income tax 
also, the analysis becomes rather ambiguous and further exploration is needed.  
 
5.3 Personal Income Tax 
 
If we regress the property tax revenues against the All-in Average PIT, we derive the 
following results as shown in Table 3. Similarly as before, models (1), (2) and (3) 
which use the Panel Least Squares estimation method, have very low R squared 
values. In model (2), the coefficient of the all-in PIT rate squared does not have the 
expected negative sign. In model (3), the coefficient has the expected negative sign 
but again its magnitude needs further investigation as we progress in our research. 
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When Panel EGLS estimation method is used, the adjusted R-squared increases with 
the introduction of an extra variable in model (5). Both estimated coefficients are 
statistically significant at 0.01% level. The all-in average rate which maximizes 
personal income tax revenues is estimated at 44%. 
 
Table 3. Personal Income Tax Revenues – All in average Tax Rate 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Personal 
Income Tax 
Revenue (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
C 
2.299***  
(0.539) 
3.264* 
(1.568) 
19.386*** 
(0.489) 
4.705*** 
(0.448) 
-0.369 
(0.612) 
16.261*** 
(0.311) 
All-in Average 
PIT Rate 
0.369*** 0.294* 
  
0.278 *** 0.704 *** 
  (0.019) (0.116) (0.016) (0.049) 
All-in Rate 
Squared   
0.001 
    
-0.008 ***                  
  (0.002) (0.001) 
1/All-in Rate 
    
-1.7794***                     
    
-1.018 ***                    
(0.11345) (0,7566) 
Method 
Panel 
Least 
Squares 
Panel 
Least 
Squares 
Panel Least 
Squares 
Panel 
EGLS 
Panel 
EGLS Panel EGLS 
Observations 523 523 523 523 523 523 
Cross - 
sections 
included 31 31 31 31 31 31 
R-squared 0.404 0.405 0.32 0.979 0.982 0.979 
R-squared 
adjusted 0.403 0.402 0.319 0.978 0.981 0.978 
F-Statistic 354.200 177.148 245.999 737.164 837.826 765.246 
Country Fixed 
Effects NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Year Fixed 
Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Standard Error 3.244 3.246 3.466 0.723 0.698 0.729 
 
The observations made above regarding corporate income tax are valid also for the 
personal income tax. We should note though, that in model (5) the average intercept 
has a negative sign, suggesting a great degree of differentiation regarding the 
calculation method, the schedule and the tax habits among the OECD countries 
included in our analysis. 
 
6. Tax Similarities among OECD countries 
 
6.1 Personal Tax 
 
The groups of countries with similarities regarding the personal tax burden are 
presented in the following Table 4. 
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According to the above Table 4, we can argue that the fixed coefficient per country 
describes the tax regime. In order to further strengthen this argument, a further 
examination of the various tax regimes country’s specific characteristics should be 
examined, which will be done in a future work. 
 
Table 4. Similarities regarding the personal tax 
1st Group 2nd Group 3nd Group 4th Group 5th Group 
Country 
Cr.fixe
d  Country 
 
Cr.fixe
d  Country 
 
Cr.fixe
d  Country 
 
Cr.fixe
d  Country 
 
Cr.fixe
d  
Turkey - 6,887    Greece - 2,078    Japan - 0,897    Netherlands 
    
0,019    
Switzerla
nd 
    
2,141    
Slovak 
Republic - 5,151    Portugal - 2,056    Korea - 0,864    Germany 
    
0,344    Belgium 
    
2,204    
Czech 
Republic - 4,482    Spain - 2,016    
United 
Kingdom - 0,434    
United 
States 
    
0,424    Canada 
    
2,551    
Estonia - 4,151      Slovenia - 0,312    Ireland 
    
0,683    
New 
Zealand 
    
3,261    
Hungary - 3,477      
Luxembo
urg - 0,282    Australia 
    
0,803    Austria 
    
4,121    
Poland - 3,043      Italy - 0,237    Israel 
    
1,056    Sweden 
    
6,521    
    Norway - 0,195    Finland 
    
1,863    Denmark 
  
10,301    
    France - 0,035        
 
7. Conclusions 
 
The present study tried to investigate the relationship between the tax rate and the 
relevant tax revenue, an issue that receives a lot of attention within the academic and 
political community. We explored both theoretically and empirically, with the 
estimation of three possible forms of the relation of revenue and taxes; the linear, the 
parabolic and the asymptotic hyperbolic.  The data sample was treated as a panel 
data and pool data in order to isolate the country specific characteristic of the tax 
regimes. 
 
What is innovative in our approach, apart from the development of the three 
functional forms, is the introduction of the country fixed effects as a variable, which 
represents the different tax regimes as well as countries’ specificities in tax 
collection, compared to previous researchers who add explanatory variables in their 
models. Results suggest that the introduction of multiple variables, which are used as 
proxies of socio economic conditions of a country, do not provide sustainable 
results. There is strong evidence that there are other proxies, which cannot be 
specified and easily obtained. However, these “unknown” proxies are important for 
the specification of the relation between tax revenues and tax rates.  
 
We conclude among others that there is a high differentiation between tax regimes 
and tax morale in different countries. Countries with low tax morale show a negative 
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cross-sectional intercept.  We also have key indications that tax evasion as well as 
the opportunities to evade taxes create Laffer’s parabolic phenomenon. When 
opportunities for tax evasion are reduced, the mathematical relationship between tax 
revenue and the tax rate is transformed into an asymptotic hyperbola. The limit is the 
maximum tax rate, beyond which the revenue does not increase further, neither 
declines, creating fiscal crises which affect variables such as GDP decline 
and increasing unemployment rate. We will attempt to explore this issue in our 
future research. 
 
The contribution of the current research, apart from exploring how tax revenue is 
generated, lies in the fact that tax policy within a country should be directed towards 
actions that will in the first place switch the existing fixed cross-sectional term from 
negative to positive. Also, if tax evasion gives its place to tax morale then the tax 
rate is actually transformed into a real fiscal policy tool without creating budgetary 
problems. 
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